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*234 Music has power. It can change attitudes, relax or energize the body, animate the spirit, influence cognitive
development, enhance the body’s self-healing mechanisms, amuse, entertain, and foster a general response which can be a
state of comfort, or in some instances even discomfort.1
A pamphlet, no matter how good, is never read more than once, but a song is learned by heart and repeated over and over;
and I maintain that if a person can put a few cold, common sense facts into a song and dress them up in a cloak of humor . . .
he will succeed in reaching a great number of workers who are too unintelligent or too indifferent to read . . . .2
Introduction
Music is everywhere. We wake up to it; we exercise with it; it accompanies us on the drive to work; we take it with us on our
iPods; it fills the elevator compartment; it keeps us company when we are waiting on the phone; we listen to it at work; we
hear it in department stores and doctors’ offices; our romantic dinner is not complete without it; and we seek it out at concerts
halls.
Music is also powerful. Modern scholarship and research indicates that music has benefits for the individual as well as for the
social group. The benefits of music therapy for the individual range from aiding individuals with autism spectrum disorders3
to helping the body manage pain and heal after trauma.4 At the societal level, *235 music has the potential to aid in conflict
transformation and peace building,5 but it has also been used during wartime to rally the troops and manipulate the masses.6
Music can provide a unifying element for political movements, and songs can be powerful devices to educate and inspire
listeners.7
Deeply expressive and evocative, music is protected both by copyright law and the First Amendment. Copyrights, as
authorized by the United States Constitution, are intended “[t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings . . . .”8 On the other hand, the First Amendment in the Bill of
Rights ensures that “Congress shall make *236 no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”9 Generally, these two
stalwart protectors of freedom of expression coexist peacefully.10 But what would happen if the scope of federal copyright
law were expanded in such a way as to infringe the First Amendment rights of others?
Copyright is a limited statutory entitlement.11 Modern copyright law gives a copyright holder a “bundle” of legal rights.12 The
legal rights for music are unique *237 in that each piece of recorded music embodies two copyrights: the musical
composition and the sound recording.13
Historically, sound recordings had no public performance right. This meant that recording artists had no authority to prohibit
others from publicly playing their recorded music, and they had no authority to collect a royalty payment.14 Today, holders of
sound recording copyrights have a limited public performance right; this right is limited to digital audio transmissions (online
music).15 As explained next, recording artists are now entitled to a royalty fee for music transmitted online.
Under existing copyright law, traditional, over-the-air AM/FM radio stations16 are exempt from paying royalties to recording
artists when broadcasting sound recordings.17 This means that recording artists receive no royalties for traditional radio play.18
Traditional radio stations compensate only the composer of the underlying *238 musical work-- the actual notes and lyrics of
a song.19 While traditional radio stations are exempt from paying the sound recording royalties, Internet radio stations that
transmit music digitally must pay a royalty fee for both the musical composition and the sound recording copyright.20

Over and above the obligation to pay two types of royalty fees for playing the music, Webcasters who play recorded music
are saddled with statutory restrictions on the content and arrangement of their playlists. Among the proscriptions on
Webcasters’ transmissions, copyright law provides that within a three-hour period, Webcasters may not play more than two
songs in a row from the same album, may not play more than three songs in a row by the same artist, and may not play more
than four songs by the same artist (or four different songs from the same compilation).21 These numerical limitations are
called the “sound recording performance complement.”22 The Supreme Court has indicated that Congress’s amendments to
the copyright act are tolerable if the scope of copyright protection is within its “traditional contours” because these contours
provide sufficient free speech protections. *239 23 However, the additional statutory restrictions on the content of Webcasters’
music transmissions are not within the “traditional contours” of copyright law and offer no free speech safeguards.
These copyright regulations, which limit the number and arrangement of songs a Webcaster may transmit within a three-hour
period, infringe the First Amendment interests of (1) the listeners, (2) the speaker, and (3) the uninhibited marketplace of
ideas. As outlined in this Article, music can affect us individually, and it can affect our larger social groups. Moreover, the
Internet offers a unique platform from which anyone of us can be a Webcaster.24
Without the diversity that Internet radio can foster, today’s media-conglomerate-dominated marketplace threatens to
commodify music and thereby render it politically impotent.25 The interests implicated by the digital transmission of music
extend beyond the private interests of the copyright holders and the lobbying efforts of these copyright holders have helped
extend the scope of copyright protection beyond its “traditional contours.”26 Accordingly, copyright is no longer an engine of
free expression.27 Rather, it now functions as a censor on a medium and a message that deserve greater breathing space.28
Part I of this Article discusses the intersection of copyright law and the First Amendment and provides an overview of the
2003 Eldred v. Ashcroft decision, where the Supreme Court declined to apply First Amendment scrutiny to the 1998 Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).29 The Supreme Court’s most *240 recent pronouncement on applying First
Amendment scrutiny for copyright regulation is the logical starting point for the present discussion. While the Eldred
decision provides a starting point for applying First Amendment scrutiny to copyright regulation, it does not decide the
matter since the issue before the Eldred Court was the extension of the term rather than the scope of copyright protection.
Part II explores a growing body of literature documenting the power of music, from promoting the well-being of individuals
to fostering reconciliation of cross-cultural disputes. The scholarship from these diverse disciplines underscores that the value
of music extends beyond the private interests of the copyright holders. The current dialogue about the First Amendment
interests affected by modern copyright law has not fully acknowledged the research that supports the unique communicative
potential of music. Part II introduces this research into the legal literature.
Part III discusses Supreme Court jurisprudence that extends First Amendment protection to music, including a listener’s right
to hear it and a speaker’s interest in playing it. Part IV traces the progression of copyright protection for music from its
inception to the tangled mess of the royalty debate saga, including an explanation of the sound recording performance
complement. This evolution of copyright protection informs the discussion of the “traditional contours” of copyright
protection. Part V explores how the ever-expanding copyright protections have been used by incumbents to maintain market
dominance without consideration of the First Amendment interests of listeners or Webcasters. And Part VI argues that
current copyright regulations, which limit the number and arrangement of Webcasters’ playlists, fail First Amendment
scrutiny.30
I. The Intersection of Copyright Law and the First Amendment
Our Founding Fathers used the English copyright system as a model31 and included within our constitutional framework the
congressional authority to create copyrights as well as patents.32 Historically, the First Amendment and copyright law have
co-existed with little conflict. The first Copyright Act, promulgated in *241 1790, was adopted by Congress one year before
the First Amendment was approved by the states.33 As the Supreme Court has indicated, “The Copyright Clause and First
Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies
are compatible with free speech principles.”34 Constitutional challenges to copyright laws on First Amendment grounds are a
relatively new phenomenon. As Marybeth Peters observed, “[u]ntil recently, the body of constitutional law relating to
copyright was almost nonexistent.”35

The body of constitutional law relating to copyright is growing as a result of litigation challenging Congress’s recent
amendments to the Copyright Act.36 In 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which
extended the term of all existing copyrights by an additional twenty years.37 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, petitioners argued the
CTEA not only exceeded Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause but also violated the First Amendment.38 In 2003, the
Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that the CTEA did not violate the Copyright Clause’s limitation that the monopoly endures only for
“limited times.”39
In rebuffing the First Amendment challenge, the Court characterized the CTEA not as a burden on “the communication of
particular facts or ideas,” but as the protection of “authors’ original expression from unrestricted exploitation.”40 The Court
also suggested that simple copying may not deserve full First Amendment *242 protection: “The First Amendment securely
protects the freedom to make--or decline to make--one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to
make other people’s speeches.”41
In concluding that Congress’s extension of the copyright term did not run afoul of the First Amendment, the Court expressed
strong confidence in “copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards” to protect free speech interests.42 These “built-in First
Amendment accommodations” are two-fold: the first accommodation is the “idea/expression dichotomy.”43 Copyright law
distinguishes between ideas and expression and protects only original expression.44 For example, the idea of an
anthropomorphic, bipedal, animated cartoon mouse is not protectable, but Walt Disney’s expression of the character Mickey
Mouse is protectable. The idea/expression dichotomy prevents an individual from gaining monopoly privileges over an idea
by only protecting an individual’s original expression of an idea, rather than extending protection to the idea itself.45 Not only
are ideas unprotected by copyright law, but facts also fall outside of the protection as well.46 Ideas and facts are freely
available for anyone to use.
The second First Amendment accommodation is the “fair use doctrine.” The fair use doctrine protects individuals who use an
author’s original expression in certain circumstances.47 These circumstances include criticism, comment, news reporting,
*243 teaching, scholarship, and research.48 The Copyright Act enumerates four factors courts can use to determine whether a
use is fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.49
These four statutory factors must be “weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”50

The Court’s confidence in the idea/expression and fair use safeguards was so strong that it noted that when “Congress has not
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”51 By implication,
copyright protection that steps outside the “traditional contours” is subject to First Amendment review.52 The Court refused to
go so far as to say that copyright protection is “categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”53
However, the Court acknowledged that Congress is given wide latitude to enact legislation that is within the traditional
contours of copyright protection: “[w]e are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments
of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”54 While Congress is given broad deference to enact
copyright protection that is within its traditional contours, such deference is not warranted when the protection exceeds *244
its traditional contours. Before exploring the traditional contours of copyright protection of music, we must explore the power
of music as well as the First Amendment protections for music.
II. The Power of Music
Music is often at the heart of our most profound personal and social experiences.55 As professor of musicology and
anthropology Thomas Turino observes: “[p]eople in societies around the world use music to create and express their
emotional inner lives, to span the chasm between themselves and the divine, to woo lovers, to celebrate weddings, to sustain
friendships and communities, to inspire mass political movements, and to help their babies fall asleep.”56 Music has a long
history in the human experience.57 Researchers speculate that Neanderthals used a form of holistic song to communicate, to
find a mate, soothe their progeny, and cement their social groupings.58 Music is used in strikingly similar ways today.

A. Music Therapy Can Be Used to Promote Healing and Wellness
Modern research shows that music has tangible and articulable benefits for us individually as well as for our collective social
groups. Music therapy can assist with a range of medical and behavioral issues from reducing the likelihood of drug *245
abuse relapse59 to engaging with autistic children.60 Music therapy has also been shown to benefit individuals of all ages, by
reducing the pain of heel-stick procedures on premature infants,61 helping troubled adolescents engage with their therapists,62
and reducing confusion and agitation in elderly adults after surgery.63 Music has been shown to help with healing64 as well as
pain management.65
*246 The scientific literature shows that music has an observable effect on our brains.66 Studying the way the brain processes
music provides unique and helpful insights into the way the brain processes information, emotions, and speech.67 This
research is fruitful because listening to music involves many cognitive and emotional components with distinct brain
substrates.68
The music we enjoy has been shown to trigger the pleasure and reward centers of the brain.69 Specifically, music has been
seen to affect the limbic and *247 paralimbic structures of the brain, including the amygdala, ventral striatum, and
hippocampus, which are our emotion processing centers.70 This research thus suggests that because our emotion processing
structures of the brain are activated by music, the emotions triggered by music are “real” emotions, not merely illusions.71
In addition to activating our emotion centers, making music has even been shown to alter the physical structures of the brain,
from enhancing certain neural systems to changing the anatomical structure and tissue density.72 Long-term musical training
may even affect how we process information, by enhancing auditory and visual memory functions.73 Such research is still
ongoing; although there is little *248 disagreement that music affects us and has deeply powerful advantages, only recently
are we availing ourselves of the full potential of those benefits.74
B. Music Can Be a Vehicle for Cross-Cultural Education and Reconciliation
In addition to the benefits music therapy has for the individual, modern scholarship has tracked the use of music in instigating
and resolving larger social conflicts.75 The power of music can be harnessed to transform social conflicts by encouraging
empathy, creativity, and nonviolence.76 Researchers from fields as diverse as ethnomusicology and political science have
examined the effect music can have on our larger social networks.77 Music can be a vehicle for healing after a social conflict78
as well as cross-cultural education and reconciliation.79 For example, *249 ethnomusicologist Benjamin Brinner has
investigated collaborations between Palestinian and Israeli musicians that combine Hebrew songs with Arabic arrangements
to create new, unified musical expressions.80 Scholars are exploring how music may provide a unique medium for examining
the dynamic character of conflict as well as offering a vehicle for resolving conflict. In addition to aiding reconciliation
efforts, music is an effective means of educating, mobilizing, and inspiring political change.81
C. Music Can Be a Vehicle to Educate and Inspire Political Change
Songs of protest and social awareness have been sung throughout our history.82 As Mariana Whitmer, a historical musicology
scholar, has noted, “[t]he history of America is reflected in our music, and readily discernible in the songs we have sung.”83
For her, “[t]here is nothing that so aptly reflects what Americans are experiencing and feeling than the songs we sing and
listen to” because these *250 “[s]ongs have entertained us, distracted us, and inspired us.”84 Indeed, these songs “reflect the
fabric of our lives as they provide a chronicle of the past and are a most effective tool for acquainting students with that
history and culture.”85
Political songs have been written for the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights movement,
the nuclear arms race, and for countless causes in between.86 The purpose of these songs is often to provide a unifying ethos
for a movement as well as a call to action.87 As Mark Matten, a professor of political science, has observed, music can
function as either “social cement or social solvent.”88 These songs serve to rally existing group members as well as to educate
potential new recruits.89 Education can come in the form of introducing new ideas and information, or providing a new lens
through which to view old ideas, or connecting together ideas the listener may not have associated before.90 Education may
even come in the form of personal enlightenment because, as professor of sociology Rob Rosenthal notes, music “often
crystallizes ideas that are floating around but have not yet coalesced into a coherent ideology for the individual, or that need
an outside voice of authority to bring them to consciousness and self-acceptance.”91 While critics argue that music fails to

have a hypodermic needle effect *251 of single-handedly changing listener attitudes, music may have some inculcating and
priming effect for listeners, which predisposes them to support certain organizations and movements.92
As our postmodern sensibilities now appreciate, messages sent by the speaker are not always the same as those received by
the listener.93 Moreover, culture and politics shape music as much as music shapes culture and politics.94 While the politics
and the music of the 1960s is no exception, technological innovations in the mid-twentieth century affected the reach of the
music and its messages. As professor of music Arnold Perris explained, “[t]he protest songs of past generations were spread
slowly and often to a limited audience. The potential of the electronic media in the 1960s was of overwhelming power. A
song heard on television was a message delivered to millions.”95
The electronic media of today offers to expand the reach of music and its messages worldwide.96 Internet radio can be used as
a tool for social and political activists. Eric Lee, founding editor of an international trade union organization, uses Internet
radio to play music: “authentic music of protest.”97 In describing the music, Lee says, “[a]ll this music, all of it, is utterly
subversive. Listen to this music *252 and you’ll want to change the world. And that’s the whole point of the station.”98
As discussed previously, the power of music can be harnessed in pursuit of peace as well as social change, but as Professor
Kent notes, “[t]hat contribution is limited so long as it is held captive by those in power.”99 And those in power, namely the
“globalized music industry,” serve the market incumbents.100 The Internet offers a vehicle to redistribute that power and
diversify the marketplace of ideas.
D. Music Transmitted by Internet Radio Fosters Diversity
Music is an indispensable vehicle for adding to the marketplace of ideas. Internet radio fosters diversity of music and,
correspondingly, of ideas.101 The ubiquity and pervasiveness of radio allows it to permeate our daily lives and draw us
together.102 We multi-task while listening to it; it accompanies us while driving in the car, cooking dinner, or walking in the
park.103 Internet radio is rapidly gaining popularity, with more than a quarter of all Internet users in the U.S. listening to
Webcasts each month.104
Internet radio is different from other modes of mass communication in that it is easy to access, inexpensive to operate, and
almost anyone can be a Webcaster.105 Unlike FCC-regulated broadcasters, we could all be Webcasters. The line between
listener and speaker is thinner online than it has ever been with other modes of *253 mass communication; new software and
technologies make the line more blurred than ever before.106
Unlike the brick-and-mortar, hard-copy world, the digital sphere offers a uniquely equalizing force where extensive
distribution networks are unnecessary because content can be distributed instantly on the Internet. Before the popularity of
online music, “most consumers learned about new music from major media radio, television and print resources, and labels
could predict, with some accuracy, what consumers would buy.”107 Now, as music business analysts note, “[t]he Internet is
shifting the axis of control towards consumers.”108
The modern music industry is characterized by radical inequality in ability to distribute music. The major music industry
companies typically promote only a handful of musicians heavily and aggressively, rather than spreading their resources
more evenly over a larger group of musicians.109 The diversity of music offered online allows for greater variety to satisfy
varying individual preferences.110 Internet radio is ideally suited to cater to niche markets,111 which are excluded from the
*254 mainstream by market incumbents.112 Indeed, as journalist Claire Cain Miller noted, “Internet radio is one of the few
bright spots in the music industry, giving airplay to dozens of genres and thousands of artists that never received airplay
before . . . .”113 Airplay is critical to creating consumer demand114 and consumer demand is critical to maintaining the saliency
and economic value of a song.115
Internet radio offers the potential to unlock the current stranglehold the music industry has on the diversity of music in the
marketplace.116 The potential of Webcasting to challenge the hegemonic power of media conglomerates has not fully
materialized117 because the fledgling technology has been hamstrung by copyright regulations that were crafted by market
incumbents.118 These regulations are outlined in Part IV infra and the efforts of market incumbents to use copyright
regulations *255 to maintain market dominance are discussed in Part V infra. The next section explores the scope of First
Amendment protections for music.

III. First Amendment Protections for Music
Art is protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has observed that artistic expression, including a “painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or [the] Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll,” is “unquestionably shielded”
by the First Amendment.119 Courts are not in the business of judging the quality of works as a prerequisite for determining if
they receive First Amendment protection; indeed, art need not rise to the level of good, or even popular, to receive First
Amendment protection.120 Courts are also not in the business of distinguishing between speech that merely entertains and
speech that informs because the line between the two is “too elusive.”121 The Supreme Court has broadly conceived the notion
of “speech” and has not limited it to the spoken word: “[T]he Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums
of expression.”122 As such, there is little debate that “[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under
the First Amendment.”123
*256 A. The Listener’s Right to Hear Music
Diversity of music promotes the marketplace of ideas.124 Music can often carry powerful social and political messages.
Listeners have a First Amendment right to hear these messages. Access to the free flow of ideas is key to informed and
reliable decision making in a democracy.125 The public has a broad right to receive information, from matters of public
concern126 to matters of economic interest.127 As Justice Brennan observed, “[i]t would be a barren marketplace of ideas that
had only sellers and no buyers.”128 Listeners thus have a recognized right to receive information.
While the Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide a First Amendment case asserting the specific right to receive
music, the Court has confirmed that the right to receive ideas and information is “vital to the preservation of a free society.”129
In Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that prohibited door-to-door distributors of
literature from knocking on the front door or ringing the doorbell.130 Justice Black, speaking for the Court, declared that “[t]he
right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. . . . This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, and
necessarily protects the right to receive it.”131 The Court has also protected an addressee’s right to receive Communist
propaganda through the mails.132 In Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Court invalidated a statute directing the Postmaster
General not to deliver a publication *257 deemed “communist political propaganda” without a written request from the
addressee because such a requirement imposed an unconstitutional burden on the addressee’s First Amendment right to
receive protected speech.133
Control of access to information and ideas is tantamount to controlling what people think. In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court
struck down a state law outlawing the private possession of obscene material because the statute impinged upon a viewer’s
right to receive information in the privacy of his home: “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”134
In 1969, a unanimous Court highlighted the listeners’ right to receive information: “[i]t is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”135 The Red Lion decision upheld the FCC’s “fairness
doctrine,” which required broadcast stations that discussed issues of public concern to give fair coverage to each side of the
issue.136 The Court explained,
[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail . . . the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences is crucial here [and] [t]hat [right] may not constitutionally be abridged . . . .137
Listeners not only have an interest in matters of public concern, but, as the Court has recognized, listeners have an interest in
knowing that a vendor will sell X commodity at Y price.138 In extending First Amendment protections to commercial speech,
the Court emphasized the value of such speech to listeners.139 In Virginia *258 State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the Court observed that the free flow of commercial information is “indispensable to the proper
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system” because it informs the numerous private decisions that animate the
system.140 The Court also noted that a “particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be
as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”141 If promoting the free flow of
information is “primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision making in a democracy, [the Court] could not say that
the free flow of information does not serve that goal.”142

Listeners have a right to receive not only political and social messages, but also esthetic ideas and experiences.143 This is a
protected corollary of a speaker’s First Amendment rights.144 As First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla has noted,
“without both a listener and a speaker, freedom of expression is as empty as the sound of one hand clapping.”145 The Supreme
Court has made it clear that a listener’s right to receive information is a key component of an “uninhibited marketplace of
ideas”146 and is “fundamental to our free society.”147 This right to listen is not preconditioned on whether the speaker is
making “other people’s speeches”148 or making her own original speech; rather, it focuses on the right of the listener to hear
the speaker’s message, irrespective of the original source.
B. The Speaker’s Right to Play Music
The First Amendment protects Webcasters’ playlists because the selection process of which music to play - and
correspondingly, which music not to play - reflects the expressive and communicative choices of the speaker.149 The selection
*259 process reflects what music the speaker believes is valuable and worth distributing to others. The Supreme Court has
explained, the “[l]iberty of circulating is as essential . . . as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the
publication would be of little value.”150
The First Amendment protects not only the original speaker, but also a non-original speaker’s edited compilation of speech.151
The dissemination of compilations of non-original speech is within the core of First Amendment protections when such
compilations reflect the expressive voice of the compiler in deciding which speech by others to transmit. The Supreme Court,
in reviewing legislation that required cable operators to carry and transmit broadcast stations through their proprietary cable
systems, explained that such “must-carry” provisions implicated “the heart of the First Amendment,” namely, “the principle
that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence.”152 The Court has a history of providing broad protection for speakers to decide which messages deserve
expression because such decisions reach the heart of the First Amendment.153
IV. Progression of Copyright Protection for Music
The Constitution expressly authorizes copyright protection,154 and copyright laws have existed since 1790.155 The first Act
limited its protection to maps, charts, *260 and books, which were the main means by which information was recorded and
disseminated in the late eighteenth century.156 The first incarnation of domestic copyright law offered no protection for
musical compositions.
A. Protections for Music Were First Extended to Printed Musical Compositions
Printed musical compositions first became federally protected copyrightable subject matter in 1831.157 At that time, the sale of
sheet music and piano rolls resulted in a copyright royalty payment for composers and was a main revenue source for
songwriters and music publishers.158 The Dramatic Composition Act of 1856 provided that music accompanying stage plays
enjoyed a right of public performance.159 Nearly forty years later, in 1897, the public performance right was extended to all
types of musical compositions, not just songs written to accompany dramatic plays.160 To publicly perform a song, the
performer now needed the permission of the song composer; composers granted this permission in the form of a performance
license and received a royalty fee in exchange. In 1909, Congress again amended the Copyright Act to introduce the “right of
mechanical reproduction” and compulsory license fees.161 Now the holder of the musical composition work received both a
royalty for the sale of sheet music as well as for public performances of the work.162
*261 Sound recordings did not receive any federal copyright protection until the 1970s.163 Prior to 1972, Professor Lionel
Sobel explained “sound recordings were not protected by federal copyright law at all--not even against piracy.”164 Congress’s
amendment gave the sound recording copyright holder (recording artists and record labels) control over the reproduction and
distribution of the recordings, but not over their public performances. This limited protection meant musical compositions
were eligible for performance royalties, but sounds recordings were not. Radio and broadcast stations were required to pay a
performance royalty to songwriters each time a song was played, but were not required to pay the recording artists.
B. Expanded Protections of Sound Recordings Were Introduced in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

In light of the technological advancements of the mid-twentieth century, Congress made a comprehensive overhaul of
copyright law in the 1976 Act.165 Accordingly, sound recordings gained fuller copyright protection under that Act.166 In the
mid-1990s, Congress expanded the scope of protection by creating a new exclusive right to publicly perform sound
recordings by means of “digital audio transmission.”167 Prior to the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act *262
(“DPRSRA”), sound recordings were the only copyrighted works not accorded a federal public performance right.168
However, the DPRSRA applied only to “digital” audio transmission, so radio and broadcast stations that transmitted analog
signals were still not required to pay a royalty to recording artists for playing their songs.
1. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
The DPRSRA created a complex169 “three-tiered system,”170 categorizing license requirements for digital audio transmissions
of sound recordings into separate rates for (1) interactive services, (2) non-interactive subscription transmissions, and (3)
non-interactive non-subscription transmissions.171 An interactive service is one that enables individuals “to receive a
transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording . . .
which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.”172 Such interactive services are not eligible for compulsory licenses and
thus must negotiate royalty rates privately with the copyright holders. Interactive services are subject to the copyright
holder’s full copyright authority because these services were seen as the main competition to CD sales.173 On the other hand,
non-interactive transmission services could either be “subscription” or “non-subscription” transmission services. Subscription
transmissions are controlled and limited to particular recipients, who have paid for *263 the transmission.174 A
non-subscription transmission is defined as “any transmission that is not a subscription transmission.”175
2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) expanded the scope of the statutory license system and imposed a
statutory royalty obligation on non-interactive subscription and non-subscription digital music providers.176 While the
DPRSRA created a three-tier system, the DMCA in effect merged non-interactive subscription and non-interactive
non-subscription together leaving interactive transmissions on the one hand and non-interactive transmissions (subscription
and non-subscription) on the other. As a direct result of the 1998 amendments, nearly all non-interactive Internet radio
stations are obligated to pay the statutory royalty fee for sound recording and musical work copyrights. In other words,
Internet radio is obligated to pay a royalty for both the sound recording and musical work copyrights; however, terrestrial
radio is still exempt from paying a royalty for the sound recording.
3. Sound Recording Performance Complement
Under current copyright law, to enjoy the benefits of a compulsory license, Webcasters must comply with specific
restrictions on how often music from the same artist, or from the same album, may be played. These restrictions, called the
“Sound Recording Performance Complement,” have two components:
(1) No more than three selections from any one album may be broadcast within any three-hour period, and no more than two
such selections may be played consecutively;177 and
(2) No more than four different selections by the same featured artist, or from any set or compilation, may be broadcast
within any three-hour period, and no more than three such selections may be played consecutively.178

In addition to complying with the Sound Recording Performance Complement, Webcasters have additional statutory
conditions that must be satisfied to enjoy *264 the benefits of the compulsory license. These additional conditions include the
following:
• A Webcaster may not make prior announcements of the playlist that disclose the title of the songs, names of the albums, or
the names of the recording artists (with exception);179
• A Webcaster’s archived program must be at least five-hours long and cannot be made available for more than two weeks;180
• A Webcaster’s continuously looped program must be at least three-hours long;181
• A Webcaster is prohibited from suggesting a false affiliation between the recording artist and the Webcaster or a particular

product or service;182
• A Webcaster must cooperated with the sound recording copyright owners on technological protection from user scanning,
which is technology employed by listeners to select a particular song to be transmitted (with exception);183
• A Webcaster may not affirmatively cause or encourage the duplication of songs, and if technologically feasible the
Webcaster must limit the ability of listeners to duplicate songs directly in a digital format;184
• A Webcaster may not transmit bootleg copies and must use sound recordings that are legally sold to the public or authorized
for performance by the copyright owner of the sound recording (with exception);185
• A Webcaster must accommodate and cannot interfere with the transmission of technical protection measures that are used
by the sound recording copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works (with exception);186 and
• A Webcaster must display the title of the song, name of the album, and the recording artist’s name to the listener as the song
is being played (with exception).187
*265 The Sound Recording Performance Complement and these additional statutory conditions have been called “one of the
DMCA’s most cumbersome provisions, entailing an inordinate compliance burden for webcasters, small and large alike.”188
Music transmissions that fail to satisfy all of these conditions are ineligible for a statutory license and must be licensed
through voluntary negotiations with the owner of the sound recording copyright. In other words, sound recording copyright
owners may grant (or withhold) voluntary licenses for digital audio transmissions that do not satisfy all of the conditions for
statutory licenses. As law professor Kimberly Craft explained, “[r]eceiving this compulsory license [i]s critical for
webcasters; the alternative would require a webcaster to seek out all of the copyright holders of each piece of music played in
order to make individualized royalty payments.”189
Without predictable and affordable statutory royalty rates, Webcasters are at the mercy of copyright holder’s exclusionary
powers as well as the power to charge supra-competitive royalty rates.190 If the copyright holder does not offer an affordable
license fee, speakers who wish to communicate through particular songs have no alternate vehicles to express themselves.191
Even complying with the statutory conditions, Webcasters expressive rights are limited. For example, a Webcaster who
wants to pay tribute to a recently deceased artist by playing more than two of the artist’s songs consecutively, or more than
four songs in a three-hour period, would be prevented from doing so under the terms of the Sound Recording Performance
Complement.192 Terrestrial radio operator’s creative choices in assembling a playlist have never been similarly hampered.
*266 193 Webcasters were largely marginalized at the legislative drafting table and thus their interests were not fully
considered.194
C. The Decade-Long Struggle to Set Sound Recording Royalty Rate
While Congress set the complex parameters for qualifying for a sound recording statutory license, it did not set the terms or
rates of the license itself.195 The Copyright Act authorized voluntary negotiations between the sound recording copyright
holders and Webcasters. In the event the parties could not agree on royalty rates, the Librarian of Congress was empowered
to establish an arbitration panel to recommend the rate.196 A decade-long saga ensued and many would-be Webcasters shut
down their operations due to the crushing royalty rates that were established. The highlights of the saga are detailed next.
*267 In 1998, negotiations began between Webcasters197 and the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. (“RIAA”),
the recording industry’s trade association. When the parties were unable to negotiate an industry-wide agreement, a
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (“CARP”) was convened in 1999.198 In 2002, the Librarian of Congress set the
Webcaster royalty rates for commercial transmissions at $0.0007 per performance and non-commercial transmission at
$0.0002 per performance (“Webcaster I”).199
The 2002 Webcaster I rates provoked an outcry from Webcasters who argued the per-performance rate was ruinous.200 As law
professor William W. Fisher explained, a fraction of a penny per performance may seem like a very small number “until one
recognizes that each transmission of a song to each listener is counted as a ‘performance.”’201 Facing bankrupting royalty

rates, a large number of small Webcasters shut down their operations.202 Some of the remaining ones turned to Congress for
relief, and others turned to the judiciary.
*268 In Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress,203 a group of Webcasters and the RIAA squared off again. The
Webcasters argued that the Webcaster I rates were arbitrarily high, and the RIAA argued they were arbitrarily low.204 During
the pendency of the case, Congress stepped in to aid small Webcasters who could not afford the rates. The Small Webcaster
Settlement Act of 2002 (SWSA)205 gave small Webcasters additional time to negotiate “alternative,” or reduced, royalty rates
with SoundExchange, the performance rights organization that manages royalties on behalf of recording artists.206
The additional time to negotiate the new royalty rates with SoundExchange was critical to the continued existence of these
Webcasters.207 At the end of 2002, small commercial Webcasters and SoundExchange reached an agreement and the rates
were calibrated to a percentage of a Webcaster’s gross revenue, rather than a per-performance basis.208 In mid-2003,
noncommercial Webcasters also reached an agreement with SoundExhange for a flat, annual fee ranging from $200 to $500
per channel.209 These privately negotiated rates were effective through the end of 2004.
In 2004, Congress, in the face of blistering criticism of the CARP,210 revised the administrative rate-setting process and
replaced the CARP with a three-judge Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”).211 In January 2005, the Court of Appeals for *269
the D.C. Circuit upheld the 2002 Webcaster I rates, in Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress.212 Applying the
“exceptionally deferential” standard of review it was bound to apply, the court upheld the Webcaster I royalty rate because
the Librarian of Congress offered a facially plausible explanation of the rate.213 In February 2005, the Librarian, with the
assistance of the CRB, began the process for setting industry-wide rates again.214
The CRB issued the new industry-wide rates in May 2007 (“Webcaster II”).215 These rates, effective from 2006 through the
end of 2010, were on a per-performance basis, rather than a percentage of Webcaster revenue. For commercial Webcasters
(small and otherwise) the CRB set the following rates: a per-performance rate of $0.0008 for 2006, a per-performance rate of
$0.0011 for 2007, a per-performance rate of $0.0014 for 2008, a per-performance rate of $0.0018 for 2009, and a
per-performance rate of $0.0019 for 2010.216 The CRB also set a $500 minimum annual fee per channel.217 For Webcasters,
like Pandora Radio, which offer hundreds of custom channels, this minimum fee would likely be more expensive than the
royalty rates.218 Noncommercial webcasters were subject to a minimum annual fee of $500 per channel or station so long as
they transmitted no more than 159,140 aggregate tuning hours (“ATH”) per month.219
Dire predictions swiftly followed the CRB’s 2007 Webcaster II rates.220 Again, the crushing royalty rates forced Webcasters,
small and large, to cry out for *270 help.221 Some Webcasters turned to the D.C. Circuit Court for assistance, and others
turned to Congress. While the D.C. Circuit Court ultimately upheld the CRB’s Webcaster II rates,222 Congress proved more
facilitative to Webcasters.
In October 2008, Congress stepped in and passed the Webcaster Settlement Act,223 which gave SoundExchange and
Webcasters the opportunity to negotiate royalty rates for online music, in lieu of the compulsory license rates set by the
CRB.224 When it appeared that SoundExchange and the Webcasters were not going to meet their February 2009 deadline for
negotiating new royalty rates, Congress again mobilized and passed the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009,225 which gave the
parties an additional thirty days to reach an agreement. An agreement was finally struck with SoundExchange and it will be
effective through 2015, when the rate-setting process will start anew.226 Until that time, commercial Webcasters that elected
the negotiated rate, rather than the statutory rate, face a graduated per-performance rate of $0.0015 in 2009, escalating each
year to $0.0025 in 2015.227
*271 To elect the SoundExchange’s reduced royalty rates, Webcasters were required to opt out of participating in rate-setting
proceedings with the CRB for 2011 through 2015.228 In March 2011, the CRB issued its latest, graduated statutory royalty
rates for commercial Webcasters (“Webcaster III”): a per-performance rate of $0.0019 for 2011; a per-performance rate of
$0.0021 for 2012, a per-performance rate of $0.0021 for 2013, a per-performance rate of $0.0023 for 2014, and a
per-performance rate of $0.0023 for 2015.229 The CRB maintained the $500 annual flat fee for noncommercial Webcasters
who transmit fewer than 159,140 ATH.230
The public response to the Librarian of Congress’s rate setting was more muted this time.231 Perhaps the third time was the
charm. Or perhaps Webcasters who could not afford the previous per-performance rates were already pushed out of the
marketplace. Compliance with the Sound Recording Performance Complement is a precondition to eligibility for the
statutory royalty rate. The statutory royalty rate has been extensively criticized in the popular press and the legal scholarship

for being ruinously high,232 administratively burdensome,233 and dizzyingly complex.234 However, the alternative to the
statutory rate is the potential for the copyright holder to deny permission altogether. Webcasters that are not eligible for the
statutory royalty rate must engage in private negotiations with copyright holders over the *272 royalty rate. In these private
negotiations copyright holders may charge any royalty fee they want, or may withhold permission altogether. Therefore,
there is no practical alternative for Webcasters but to comply with the Sound Recording Performance Complement.
V. The Expansion of Copyright Protection Is Used to Maintain Market Hegemony
The current copyright law is the product of a minority’s special interests,235 which now places burdensome regulations on
would-be Webcasters and limits our access to Internet radio.236 Copyright regulation of online music, largely the result of
intra-industry negotiations, reflects the efforts of market incumbents to maintain their dominance and squelch competitors.237
Professor of law Robert Denicola has characterized copyright legislation as a “series of contract negotiations” between
interest groups without any “independent congressional evaluation of the substance of the negotiated agreements.”238
The music industry has a history of resisting newcomers via copyright law.239 Professor Neil Netanel has observed that “the
incumbent industries have repeatedly deployed their formidable copyright arsenal as a tool to stifle competition from *273
emerging new media and thus to maintain their dominant market position in the production and distribution of music,
television programs, movies, journals, and books.”240
An example of this behavior can be seen in the treatment of small Webcasters by the RIAA, the recording industry’s trade
group. Before the 2002 Webcaster I rates were set, there were allegations that “the RIAA refused to deal with small
webcasters,” “that it was not treating everyone equally,” and that some “webcasters were jockeying to curry unfair favor with
the RIAA.”241 Legislators who were key players in advocating for the DMCA began to question the RIAA and its conduct:
“We passed the DMCA. We gave you a lot of what you wanted. You told us without it you wouldn’t put your content out.
What’s going on? Are you leveraging your copyrights to impede distribution rather than enhance distribution?”242
Ever-expanding copyright protections have been leveraged to maintain market dominance.243 The mind-numbing complexity
of the music royalty system, along with the cost-prohibitive royalty rate, has produced a chilling effect on would-be
Webcasters. As Professor Fisher noted, after Webcaster I was promulgated about one third of Webcasters shut down.244 The
administrative burden of tracking listenership and playlists, along with the cost-prohibitive royalty rate has also had an effect
on the gross number of Webcasters as well as the diversity in the marketplace. These regulations encumber niche music more
than popular music, because of the number and variety of songs needed to comply with the Sound Recording Performance
Complement.245 Commentators have observed that “[t]he *274 rules set forth in the ‘sound recording complement’ are at best
unwieldy, and at worst, thwart the intent and nature of copyright law.”246
VI. Copyright Regulation of Webcasters Fails First Amendment Scrutiny
The First Amendment embraces the expressive power of music.247 The First Amendment “unquestionably” protects music listeners’, speakers’, and society’s interests in music.248 The natural extension of the Court’s reasoning in Eldred v. Ashcroft
is that First Amendment scrutiny of copyright regulation of online music may be warranted when either (1) one’s own
speech-making abilities are impaired, or (2) the traditional free-speech safeguards are unavailing.249 Both defects exist in the
Sound Recording Performance Complement.
A. The Sound Recording Performance Complement Impairs Webcasters’ Own Speech-Making Abilities
The Sound Recording Performance Complement impairs the speech-making abilities of Webcasters. As discussed previously,
Webcasters have a cognizable First Amendment interest in the creative arrangement and content of their playlists. And this
expressive activity is infringed by the limitation that a Webcaster may play, in any three-hour period, no more than three
different songs from an album, so long as no more than two songs are played in a row, or four different songs from the same
artist, or from any boxed set, so long as no more than three songs are played in a row.250 Webcasters pay a royalty to both the
songwriter and the recording artist when a song is played online, but the content of the Webcaster’s message is restricted in
exchange for the benefit to enjoy the statutory license.
The proposition that a Webcaster can simply decline to comply with the Sound Recording Performance Complement ignores

the practical reality. The prospect of negotiating privately with the rights holders for each song is unthinkable. The practical
reality is that Webcasters must be eligible to receive the statutory rate because otherwise their operation is unworkable. But to
receive this statutory rate, Webcasters’ expressive rights are infringed. While Eldred could be read as only delaying access to
copyrighted works whose term was extended for a limited additional *275 time, the Sound Recording Performance
Complement is a perpetual burden on a Webcaster’s freedom of expression.
B. The Sound Recording Performance Complement is Outside the Traditional Contours of Copyright Protection and
Affords No Free Speech Safeguards
In Eldred, the Court shied away from scrutinizing the CTEA under a standard that would render constitutionally suspect
previous copyright term extensions.251 Congress on at least three prior occasions - principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976enlarged the term of protection for existing and future copyrights.252 The Eldred Court determined that the CTEA’s most
recent extension was a rational enactment within Congress’s legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause.253
Unlike the CTEA, where it was the term of protection that was again extended, the DPRSRA and the DMCA expanded the
scope of protection for digital sound recording. While there may be precedent for incremental enlargements of the scope of
protection for music, the restrictions on the arrangement and content of a broadcaster’s playlist is unprecedented. The Sound
Recording Performance Complement is an entirely new phenomenon in copyright law and is outside the “traditional
contours” of copyright protection. Our copyright laws have never before set numerical limits on the amount and arrangement
of works that an authorized user could exploit. Therefore, this recent Congressional expansion of the scope of copyright
protection for digital sound recordings is not within the traditional contours and is not due the same deference as the CTEA
expansion of the term of protection.
Not only are Webcasters’ expressive freedoms infringed, but there are no “built-in First Amendment accommodations”254 to
shield the Sound Recording Performance Complement from scrutiny. As outlined previously, music is a powerful vehicle to
convey ideas and ideas are not protected by copyright law. However, an artist’s expression through music is protected by
copyright law. Still, the distinction between an idea conveyed in a piece of music and the particular expression of that idea
through the medium of music is far from clear. In instances where the message and the medium are inextricably intertwined,
the idea/expression dichotomy provides poor protection for others who want to access the idea contained in the copyrighted
music.
Additionally, the fair use doctrine is not designed to combat the threat to free expression posed by the Sound Recording
Performance Complement. A “fair use” of a copyrighted work means the user need not seek permission or license from the
*276 copyright holder.255 In essence, a fair use allows another to use a copyrighted work for free. But Webcasters do not use
copyrighted music for free. Webcasters who digitally transmit music pay a royalty to both the songwriter and the recording
artist. Yet, the content and organization of their playlists are unduly constrained and there is no mechanism to protect the
expressive interests of Webcasters. While the fair use doctrine, as the Supreme Court explained, provides a “guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright,”256 this breathing space is of little assistance to a Webcaster who wants to
play three songs in a row from a particular album, or play five songs by the same artist within a three-hour period - and pay
the statutory royalty rate.
C. The Sound Recording Performance Complement Burdens More Speech Than Necessary and Is Not Narrowly
Tailored
First Amendment review often begins with an assessment of the government’s purpose in adopting the regulation.257 The
Sound Recording Performance Complement was nominally adopted to prevent or reduce piracy.258 Determining if a
regulation is content-neutral or content-based, the Supreme Court has explained, turns largely on “whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”259 A court would likely categorize
the Sound Recording Performance Complement as a content-neutral regulation of speech, which would receive intermediate
scrutiny.260
Content-neutral regulation of speech survives First Amendment scrutiny if the regulation “advances important governmental
interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further
those interests.”261 The Sound Recording Performance Complement is a sufficiently *277 novel construct within the copyright
schema - meaning it is not within the traditional contours of copyright law - such that the government must show that it

burdens no more speech than necessary. Thus, the Sound Recording Performance Complement is not due the deference the
Court gave the CTEA.262 Unlike the must-carry regulations that promoted dissemination of local broadcasting through cable
networks, which fed the marketplace of ideas, the copyright regulations - in effect, must-not-carry regulations - for Internet
radio diminish the marketplace.263 The marketplace has lost not only a large number of speakers, but the remaining speakers
have lost creative control over their messages.
The government must do more than simply identify an important interest to survive intermediate scrutiny. The government
must establish that “the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these
harms in a direct and material way.”264 Moreover, such regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest” and must “leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”265
The harm the government sought to alleviate by creating the Sound Recording Performance Complement was on-demand
access to music that would replace CD sales and the likelihood of home copying. However, the numerical limits on the
content and arrangement of Internet radio transmissions are a poor solution to that problem. This mechanism not only
burdens more speech than necessary to prevent unrestricted exploitation of digital music, but there is no evidence that the
Sound Recording Performance Complement in fact remedies the problem. At this time, there are a number of Internet
applications that allow users to capture a potentially unlimited amount of music disseminated on Internet radio and download
it to their music storage devices.266 Therefore, restricting Webcasters’ playlist content and arrangement is an ineffective means
to limit listeners from downloading music from Internet radio transmissions. As commenters have observed, the Sound
Recording Performance Complement “impedes small webcasters from legally entering the marketplace, and as a result,
prevents new works from reaching the public.”267 *278 These regulations not only fail to prevent piracy, but they have the
effect of reducing the vibrant potential of this burgeoning medium. Thus such regulations burden more speech than necessary
to alleviate the harms of on-demand access to music for free.
Current copyright law adds an unacceptably high burden on the First Amendment speech interests at issue in the digital
transmission of music. It is no longer simply a catalyst for new expression. It is now a sword to strike down rivals and new
media.
Conclusion
Music is a uniquely expressive mode of communication. It can often crystallize thoughts and emotions where language alone
fails us. As any star-crossed lover who made a mixed tape for a girlfriend or boyfriend can attest, music can say what our
own words fail to express. Playing music can be cathartic and expressive for the speaker. It can also communicate across
generations and across cultures.
Researchers are now documenting what many anecdotally believed: music can have powerful effects on us. Medical
researchers have been tracking the wellness, regenerative, and pain management benefits of music therapy. And political
scientists and ethnomusicologist have been exploring the cross-cultural communicative and healing powers of music as well
as the power of music to help educate and inspire political change.
Music is a powerful tool. There needs to be adequate “breathing space”268 around the creative choices of Webcasters that
transmit music online. The built-in accommodations, which generally shield copyright law from First Amendment scrutiny,
afford no protection for a Webcaster’s expressive voice.
The First Amendment provides broad protection for speakers to decide which messages deserve expression; however,
Webcasters are effectively denied the ability to make such decisions in their messages. The limitation on the number and
arrangement of Webcasters’ playlists restricts their creative choices. Webcasters need the predictability of a statutory royalty
rate; thus, they have no choice but to comply with the Sound Recording Performance Complement.
Powerful lobbying efforts of market incumbents have urged the expansion of copyright beyond its “traditional contours.”269
These incumbents have a history of disfavoring small and marginal voices. Congress seems to have ratified this
discrimination by promulgating incumbent-friendly copyright regulations. Copyright has expanded beyond the safe-zone
within the First Amendment. Copyright regulation of Internet radio - of which the Sound Recording Performance
Complement is *279 one example - threatens to strangle this nascent medium as well as the expressive voice of those
interested in using it. For these reasons, the Sound Recording Performance Complement cannot withstand First Amendment

scrutiny.
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